Digest: Grosset v. Wenaas by Alikin, Charles
Chapman Law Review
Volume 12 | Issue 1 Article 14
2008
Digest: Grosset v. Wenaas
Charles Alikin
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chapman Law Review by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles Alikin, Digest: Grosset v. Wenaas, 12 Chap. L. Rev. 195sa (2008).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol12/iss1/14
~--------------
Digest: Grosset v. Wenaas 
Charles Alikin 
Opinion by Baxter, J., expressing the unanimous view of the Court. 
Issue 
Is continuous stock ownership throughout the litigation process 
required to maintain standing in a shareholder's derivative action? 
Facts 
JNI Corporation (JNI), a designer, manufacturer and seller of 
hardware and software products, was incorporated in Delaware and based 
in San Diego. 1 After JNI' s stock price fell and securities fraud class 
actions were filed against the corporation, Richard Grosset filed a 
shareholder's derivative action on behalf of JNI against some of its 
directors and officers for breach of fiduciary duty and other causes of 
action.2 When Grosset sold his stock, the trial court permitted shareholder 
Sik-Lin Huang to intervene to continue litigating the action.3 
In September 2002, JNI's board of directors created a special litigation 
committee (SLC) to investigate the allegations in the derivative complaint 
and to determine whether to bring the action.4 After an extensive 
investigation, the SLC issued a report concluding that "the derivative 
claims lacked merit and would likely not be successful."5 The court 
dismissed the complaint on the SLC's motion with prejudice.6 Before 
Huang appealed, the stockholders voted to approve a merger whereby 
another company would purchase all outstanding shares of JNI stock. 7 
The Court of Appeal dismissed Huang's appeal on the grounds that he 
no longer had standing to pursue the litigation after selling his JNI stock in 
the merger. 8 The court determined that Delaware law applied because the 
standing requirements implicate the internal affairs of a corporation.9 
1 Grosset v. Wenaas, 175 P.3d 1184, 1187 (Cal. 2008). 
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Under the law of Delaware, a plaintiff who brings a derivative action must 
maintain continuous stock ownership in the corporation throughout the 
action's pendency. 10 The court alternatively held that Huang lacked 
standing in any event because California law imposes a continuous 
ownership requirement that parallels Delaware law. 11 The Supreme Court 
of California granted review. 12 
Analysis 
After reviewing basic principles of corporation law and shareholder 
derivative litigation, the Court compared Delaware and California law. 13 
The Court noted that the relevant Delaware statute provides that, "[i]n any 
derivative suit instituted by a stockholder" the plaintiff must allege that he 
held stock at the time of the transaction from which the suit arose. 14 
Delaware courts interpreted this statute to require that a derivative plaintiff 
also maintain stock ownership throughout the litigation. 15 The Court found 
that California's statute states that "'[n]o action may be instituted or 
maintained in right of any ... corporation by any holder of shares ... of 
the corporation' unless conditions such as the contemporaneous stock 
ownership requirements are met."16 
The Court then noted that two appellate decisions reached opposite 
conclusions regarding whether a plaintiff is required to maintain continuous 
stock ownership to have standing to bring a derivative suit on behalf of the 
remaining shareholders. 17 
The Court concluded that, while the "instituted or maintained" 
language does not clearly impose a continuous ownership requirement, 
other considerations ultimately support and compel this interpretation of 
the statute. 18 The Court said that contemporaneous ownership furthers the 
statutory purpose to minimize abuse of the derivative suit. 19 The Court 
explained that "[b ]ecause a derivative claim does not belong to the 
stockholder asserting it, standing to maintain such a claim is justified only 
by the stockholder relationship and the indirect benefits made possible 
thereby, which furnish the stockholder with an interest and incentive to 
seek redress for the injury to the corporation."20 "Once this relationship 
ceases to exist," the court continued, "the derivative plaintiff lacks standing 
10 Jd. 
II fd. at 1188-89. 
12 ld. at 1188. 
13 Id. at 1189-90 (internal quotations omitted). 
14 Jd. at 1190. 
15 !d. 
16 !d. at 1191 (quoting CAL. CORP. CODE§ 800(b)(l) (West 2008)). 
17 !d. at 1192 (citing Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Ct. App. 1985); Gaillard v. 
Natomas Co., 219 Cal. Rptr. 74 (Ct. App. 1985)). 
18 Id. at 1193. 
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because he or she no longer has a financial interest in any recovery pursued 
for the benefit of the corporation."21 The Court also noted that a "vast 
majority" of other states have a contemporaneous ownership requirement.22 
Holding 
The Court held that a shareholder lacks standing to continue litigating 
a derivative action once he no longer owns stock in the corporation.23 
Legal Significance 
California law now requires a plaintiff in a shareholder's derivative 
suit to maintain continuous stock ownership throughout the pendency of 
the litigation, including appeals. A plaintiff in a derivative action who 
ceases to be a stockholder by reason of a merger ordinarily loses standing 
to continue the litigation. Exceptions may include situations where the 
merger itself is used to wrongfully deprive the plaintiff of standing, or if 
the merger is merely a reorganization that does not affect the plaintiffs 
ownership interest. 
21 /d. at 1194 (internal quotations omitted). 
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